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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-1838 
_____________ 
 
TAKELE EDOSSA DINSSA 
Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Respondent 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A097-921-001) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Rosalind K. Malloy 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 21, 2014 
 
Before:  FUENTES, FISHER, Circuit Judges, and JONES, District Judge.
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(Filed: February 10, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
                                              
 
1
 Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II, United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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 Takele Dinssa petitions for review of a final order of removal issued by the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial 
of his applications for asylum and withholding of removal. For the reasons set forth 
below, we dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review. 
I. 
 Dinssa, an ethnic Oromo and citizen of Ethiopia, was admitted to the United States 
on a nonimmigrant visa and was later issued a Notice to Appear in Immigration Court for 
overstaying his visa. Dinssa conceded removability, but sought asylum, withholding of 
removal, and protection pursuant to the regulations implementing the United States’ 
obligations under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a), 
1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17(a). 
 Based on documentary and testimonial evidence regarding the Oromo Liberation 
Front (“OLF”) and Dinssa’s admitted support for that group, the IJ found that Dinssa was 
statutorily ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal due to the material support 
to a terrorist organization bar. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd). In pertinent part, 
the IJ found that Dinssa belonged to a group of businessmen that “contribut[es] money to 
cover medical and other expenses of OLF cadres” and that the “evidence indicates that 
[Dinssa] financially supported the OLF.” AR 172. Additionally, while Dinssa testified on 
direct examination that “he would never knowingly give money to someone who would 
use it for violence,” he testified on cross examination that “he knew that the OLF has an 
army wing of fighters.” AR 172. Accordingly, the IJ determined that Dinssa had not set 
forth clear and convincing evidence that the statutory “knowledge exception” to the 
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material support bar applied. While the IJ found Dinssa to be ineligible for asylum and 
withholding of removal, she granted him CAT deferral of removal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.17(a). 
 In Dinssa’s subsequent appeal to the BIA, he adopted the IJ’s findings of fact, 
noted that the IJ’s “consideration of the record was comprehensive and complete,” and 
only challenged the IJ’s legal determinations. AR 53. The BIA, in a written opinion, 
affirmed the IJ’s decision. Dinssa filed this petition for review.2 
II. 
 On appeal, Dinssa argues that the material support bar does not apply to him 
because his conduct was lawful. We lack jurisdiction to hear this argument because 
Dinssa did not exhaust it before the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (“A court may 
review a final order of removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative 
remedies available to the alien as of right.”); see also Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 
120-21 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is 
a jurisdictional requirement and that a petitioner must “raise[] all issues before the BIA”). 
                                              
2
 This Court has jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final removal order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a). Where, as here, the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s decision and adds analysis of 
its own, we review the decisions of both the IJ and the BIA. See Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 
488 F.3d 142, 153 n.16 (3d Cir. 2007). We exercise de novo review over the agency’s 
conclusions of law. Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006). We review the 
denial of asylum and withholding of removal for substantial evidence. Li Hua Yuan v. 
Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2011). Under the substantial evidence standard, 
“administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would 
be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). In assessing 
whether the agency’s determinations are supported by substantial evidence, we must 
decide “whether a reasonable fact finder could make such a determination based upon the 
administrative record.” Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
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 We also reject Dinssa’s contention that the material support bar does not apply to 
him due to the OLF’s present inactivity. Assuming without deciding that the OLF is 
currently inactive, we agree with the BIA that Dinssa has offered “no legal authority to 
support his construction of the material support bar as only pertaining to currently-active 
terrorist organizations.” AR 19. 
  Dinssa next argues that his support to the OLF did not amount to “material 
support” within the meaning of the statute. This argument fails because it is premised on 
facts contrary to those found by the IJ, affirmed by the BIA, and adopted by Dinssa 
himself. Dinssa asserts on appeal that he “did not provide any support to active and 
militant members of a terrorist organization,” that “[n]one of the assistance that he 
provided offered any logistical support to the OLF,” and that he only “provided some 
assistance to one member of the OLF.” Pet. Br. at 22. However, this assertion contradicts 
the IJ’s unchallenged finding that he “financially supported the OLF.” AR 172.  
 The erroneous premise of a legal argument is a sufficient ground to reject it. See 
Inst. for Scientific Info., Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 555 F.2d 128, 130 (3d Cir. 1977) 
(“[T]here can be no truth to a conclusion drawn from an incorrect premise.”); see also 
Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 149 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that “‘[t]he duty of [the] 
court . . . is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, 
and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions’” (quoting Mills v. 
Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)) (alterations in original)). Accordingly, we decline to 
review Dinssa’s argument that his conduct did not constitute material support.  
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 Finally, Dinssa asserts that the IJ and BIA incorrectly found that he did not satisfy 
the “knowledge exception” to the material support bar, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd). Dinssa contends that his testimony proves by clear and 
convincing evidence that he qualifies for the “knowledge exception,” since “he 
repeatedly stated that he has never supported violent activities and that he would never 
knowingly support violent activities.” Pet. Br. at 28. However, Dinssa testified on cross 
examination that he knew the OLF had “an army wing of fighters” which undermines his 
claim that he did not knowingly support the OLF’s violent activities. AR 172. Based on 
the record, a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to conclude that Dinssa met 
his burden of demonstrating that he qualified for the “knowledge exception.” Therefore, 
we affirm the agency’s findings as supported by substantial evidence.  
III. 
 For the reasons stated above, we dismiss in part and deny in part Dinssa’s petition 
for review. 
